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PROTECTION OF A BUYER AT AN EXECUTION SALE
UNDER U.C.C. SECTION 9-307
In National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 1 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court was faced with a question of first impression under the
Uniform Commercial Code: whether a creditor who purchases at his own
execution sale is entitled to protection, as a buyer under Section 9-307(2)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, against a perfected but unrecorded
purchase-money security interest. 2 Since the decision of the Massachusetts
court may well be followed in other jurisdictions due to the Code's policy
of uniformity,3 it is necessary to fully analyze the rationale and result in
Vera.
I. THE PRINCIPAL CASE AND ITS EFFECT
National Shawmut, the plaintiff in the principal case, held a purchase-
money security interest in an automobile bought by one Gomes from the
Howard Motor Company. The purchase-money security interest was ob-
tained by the plaintiff through an assignment by the Howard Motor Com-
pany and was perfected4 without filing under section 9-302(1)(d). The
defendant Vera, a judgment creditor of the debtor, caused an attachment
of the automobile. At the subsequent execution sale, the defendant bought
the automobile without knowledge of the purchase-money security interest
held by the plaintiff. Shawmut, claiming that under section 9-503 of the
Code its perfected purchase-money security interest entitled it to immediate
possession of the automobile, 5 brought an action to recover. The defendant,
in response, contended that he was entitled to possession free of the plain-
tiff's purchase-money security interest because, under section 9-307(2), 6 a
buyer of consumer goods who buys for his own personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, for value, and without knowledge of the security interest,
1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 223 N.E.2d 515 (1967).
2 U.C.C. § 9-107 (All citations to the Code are to the 1962 Official Text) states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that
it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
a U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
4 "Perfection" means that the secured party has taken all of the steps required by
section 9-303, and as such is generally protected against creditors and transferees of the
debtor. U.C.C. § 9-303, Comment 1.
5 U.C.C. § 9-503 states in part, "fulnless otherwise agreed a secured party has on
default the right to take possession of the collateral."
U.C.C. § 9-307(2) states:
In the case of consumer goods ... a buyer takes free of a security interest
even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for
value and for his own personal, family or household purposes . . . unless prior
to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such
goods.
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takes free of a perfected but unrecorded purchase-money security interest.
The court held that a judgment creditor who buys at his own execution sale
is not a "buyer" under section 9-307(2) and, consequently, the defendant
did not take free of the plaintiff's purchase-money security interest. Shaw-
mut was, therefore, entitled to immediate possession of the automobile under
section 9-503.7
Noting that Article 9 does not define "buyer," the court held that
"buyer" was included within the section 1-201(33) definition of "purchaser"
vis-à-vis "purchase" as defined in section 1-201(32), and that such "pur-
chase" transactions referred only to "voluntary transactions." In addition,
referring to writers who have contended that section 9-307(2) is restricted
solely to transactions involving consumer buyers taking from consumer
sellers, and, to a lesser extent upon pre-Code law, the court concluded that
a judgment creditor was not a "buyer" as intended by section 9-307(2).
According to the court, "buyer" in section 9-307(2) is limited in its defini-
tion to "innocent consumer purchasers of consumer goods, in wholly
consensual and uncoerced transactions, from the original consumer pur-
chaser." The court believed that a different construction presents the possi-
bility of a purchase-money security interest's priority being defeated by a
subordinate creditor. The creditor could cause an attachment of the collateral,
and under section 9-307(2) buy at the subsequent execution sale free of
the purchase-money security interest.
Although the court limits its decision to the judgment creditor buying
at an execution sale, the requirement that the sale be "voluntary" applies
just as logically to a typical consumers buying at an execution sale. The sale
is no more "voluntary" when a typical consumer buys than when the judg-
ment creditor buys. In both cases, the debtor is forced to sell by a process
of attachment and execution. Thus, under the court's rationale, neither the
attaching-creditor buyer nor the ordinary consumer buyer would be pro-
tected under section 9-307(2).
II. THE MEANING OF "BUYER" AND "PURCHASER" UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 1-201(33) defines "purchaser" as one "who takes by purchase"
and "purchase" is defined in section 1-201(32) as including "taking by sale,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any
other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." (Emphasis
added). An examination of the definition of purchase as interpreted by the
Vera court reveals two interrelated issues: (1) whether the "buying" of the
goods at an execution sale is encompassed within the phrase "taking by
sale" thereby including buyer within the definition of purchaser; and (2)
whether the phrase "any other voluntary transaction" so qualifies "taking
7
 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 243, 223 N.E.2d at 519.
8
 Id. at 242, 223 N.E.2d at 519.
° Goods are classified in U.C.C. § 9-109 according to the purpose for which they
are held. Therefore, if a buyer at an execution sale bought goods primarily for "personal,
family or household purposes," the goods in his possession would be "consumer goods"
and he would be classified as a consumer.
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by sale" that any provision of the Code pertaining to "taking by sale," such
as section 9-307(2), refers only to "taking by sale" at a "voluntary trans-
action." An affirmative answer to both these questions logically results in
the exclusion of buyers at an execution sale from the protection of section
9-307(2), since an execution sale is obviously not a "voluntary trans-
action.")
"Buyer" is explicitly defined only in Article 2, where it is defined rather
broadly as one "who buys or contracts to buy goods,'" 11 and "sale" is defined
as the "passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price .. .." 12
These two sections clearly indicate that a "buyer" under Article 2 is one who
"takes by sale." Furthermore, when the use of "buyer" or "buying" is traced
throughout the Code, it will be noted that these terms are used only in regard
to a person who takes by sale. 13 Thus, it is evident that "buyer" is included
within the broader classification of "purchaser" under section 1-201(33).
The meaning and effect of the phrase "any other voluntary transaction"
in section 1-201(32) is not so clear. Since "buyer" seems restricted to a
person "taking by sale," thereby placing him within the - definition of "pur-
chaser," the court's interpretation that "taking by sale" refers only to "taking
by sale" in a "voluntary transaction" would necessarily mean that any Code
reference to "buying," "buyer," "purchase," or "purchaser" is referring to
wholly consensual and uncoerced transactions. However, many Code pro-
visions dealing with "involuntary" transactions specifically refer to such
terms as "purchase,"" "purchaser," 15 and "buy."16 This logical inconsis-
tency, alone, creates doubt as to the validity of the Vera court's interpre-
tation.
However, an acceptance of the alternative conclusion that "taking by
sale" or "buying" under the Code refers to "involuntary" as well as "volun-
tary" transactions forces the question of just why the phrase "or any other
voluntary transaction"' is included in the definition of "purchase" under
section 1-201(32). In the New York Law Revision Commission Report on
the Uniform Commercial Code, the comment on section 1-201(32) states
that the definition of "purchaser" avoids the necessity of inserting an express
reference in certain sections to a person acquiring an interest by a "gratu-
10 See Motor Parts & Bearing Co. v. O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc., 251 Miss. 326, 331,
169 So. 2d 444, 445 (1964).
11 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a).
12 U.C.C. § 2 -106(1).
13 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-401, 7-205, 8-303, 9-206.
14 E.g., U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(a) states: "A holder does not become a holder in due
course ... by purchase , . at judicial sale. . . ."
15 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-314(3) states: "A purchaser ... at a foreclosure sale .. . is a
subsequent purchaser. ..." U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(a) states: "The purchaser ... in the case
of a public sale. . .."
10 E,g., U.C.C. § 9-504(3) states: "The secured party may buy at any public
sale. . . ."
17 The phrase "or any other voluntary transaction" is new to the definition of
"purchaser." None of the acts that are sources of the Code definition include the phrase.
See Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 53; Uniform Sales Act § 76; Uniform Stock Transfer
Act § 22; Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 1; Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 58.
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itous voluntary transaction." 18 By including "taking by gift" in the definition
of purchaser, the Code has done away with the necessity of giving considera-
tion in order to be considered a "purchaser." Therefore, the reference to
"any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property" may
mean that, besides "taking by gift," any voluntary transaction considered
sufficient to create an interest in property, although gratuitous, will make the
one who receives the property interest a "purchaser." In other words, it is
arguable that the phrase was inserted into the definition to cover trans-
actions that are similar to "taking by gift,"1° but due to the exchange of
some nominal consideration they "technically" are not. This proposition is
supported by the fact that the phrase "voluntary conveyance" has long been
used in real property cases to identify a conveyance made without "valuable
consideration,"2° such as a conveyance made in return for "one dollar, love
and affection." 21 It is arguable, therefore, that when the Code draftsmen
added "or any other voluntary transaction" to the definition of "purchaser,"
their only intention was to modify "taking by gift" and not the other
methods of "taking."
As shown by the foregoing analysis, however, an examination of sections
1-201(32) and 1-201(33) is far from conclusive in determining whether
"buyer" under section 9-307(2) is intended to include buyers at an execu-
tion sale. Thus, it is both appropriate and necessary to examine section 9-
307(2) as a reflection of the intent and policy of the Code in its protection
of purchase-money security interests and consumer buyers.
III. SECTION 9-307(2) AS A REFLECTION OF CODE POLICY
A basic policy of the Uniform Commercial Code is to protect a security
interest as long as it does not interfere with the normal flow of commerce. 22
In addition, the purchase-money security interest is given a particularly
favorable position in relation to the other security interests governed by
Article 9. 23
 This favoritism is evidenced by the general priority given a
purchase-money security interest over other security interests, 24 and, of more
significance to this discussion, by the exemption of certain purchase-money
security interests from the requirement of filing 2c
18 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 292 (1955) (hereinafter cited as NYLRCR).
19
 The word "gift" is also new to the definition of purchaser since it does not appear
in any of the prior acts. See Uniform Acts cited note 17 supra.
20 See, e.g., Hewett v. Continental Supply of Huntsville, Inc., 271 Ala. 660, 127
So. 2d 834 (1961) ; London v. G.L. Anderson Brass Works, 197 Ala. 16, 72 So. 359
(1916); Vilas v. Seith, 108 Vt. 526, 189 A. 862 (1937).
21
 See, e.g., Wells v. Smith, 198 Ark. 476, 129 S.W.2d 251 (1939).
22 See Lee, Perfection and Priorities under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo.
L.J. 1, 34 (1962); Project, California Chattel Security and Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 806, 898 (1961).
`xl See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv, L. Rev. 838, 861 (1959) ; Lee, supra note
22, at 21-22.
24
 See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), (4).
25
 U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) states: "(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect
all security interests except the following•  (d) a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for a fixture under Section 9-313 or
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Encouraging the sale of consumer goods by allowing perfection of
security interests without filing is not an innovation by the Code. Prior to the
Code many jurisdictions did not subject conditional sales contracts in con-
sumer goods to filing requirements. 26 What is "new," however, is the pro-
tection afforded the buyer of consumer goods who meets the qualifications of
section 9-307(2), which allows him under certain circumstances to take free
of a perfected but unrecorded security interest. 27 Section 9-307(2) was
included by the drafters of the Code to partially counteract the favoritism
given the purchase-money security interest under section 9-302(1) (d). 28
It should be noted that four states have deleted section 9-307(2) from their
versions of the Code2° on the ground that it excessively detracts from the
protection given the secured party under section 9-302(1)(d)." The re-
tention of section 9-307(2) by the rest of the Code jurisdictions, 31 however,
indicates a basic recognition that some degree of protection is needed for
the consumer buyer against unrecorded purchase-money security interests.
In codifying this policy of protecting certain consumer buyers against
unrecorded purchase-money security interests, section 9-307(2) has set out
explicit criteria that must be met by the buyer in order to be protected.
Specifically, he must buy without knowledge of the security interest, for
value, and for his own personal, family or household purposes. Since section
9-307(2) does not explicitly require the transaction to be "voluntary," if a
buyer at an execution sale is to be excluded from its protection it must be
because he fails to meet the specific requirements of the section or because
an underlying policy of the Code excludes such buyers from protection under
section 9-307(2).
The requirements of section 9-307(2) offer no basis upon which a
buyer in the normal sales transaction and a typical buyer at an execution
sale can be distinguished. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, both
must equally be considered to buy for value, without knowledge of the out-
standing security interest, and for his own personal, family or household
purposes. However, a comparison of the degree to which a buyer at a
"typical" sale and the judgment creditor buying at his own execution sale
fulfill the requirements of section 9-307(2) is a matter of greater complex-
ity. Although it can generally be assumed that both buy for personal, family
for a motor vehicle required to be licensed .	 ." The Massachusetts version of the
U.C.C. deletes the phrase "or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed." Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 9-302(1)(d) (1958).
26 See U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 4.
27 See, e.g., 3 NYLRCR at 2059.
28 See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, Comment 4, 9-307, Comment 3; 3 NYLRCR at 2059;
Weingarten, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Definitions and Rules of
General Application, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 537, 611 (1963).
29 Cal. Comm, Code § 9307 (West 1964) ; OkIa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 9-307 (1963) ;
Tenn. Code Ann. tit. 47, § 9-307 (5upp. 1966). Kansas has also omitted section 9-307(2).
See Uniform Comm. Code § 9-307(2) (U.L.A. Supp. 1966).
30 H. Marsh & W. Warren, Report on Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 9-43 (1961); 2 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code Rep. 213-14 (1965).
31 The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by all states except Louisiana,
as well as by the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.
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or household purposes, whether the judgment creditor buys for "value" and
"without knowledge of the security interest" is open to question. Despite
the fact that the judgment creditor can be said to have two "roles," one as
a judgment creditor and the other as a buyer, he is still in fact one and the
same person. On the basis of this conclusion, the value given by the judg-
ment creditor was questioned in pre-Code cases, especially when he credited
the amount he bid to the debtor's account rather than paying the money
directly to the debtor.82
Under the Code, however, it is evident that the controversy over whether
a judgment creditor in such a situation actually gives "value" is resolved.
Section 1-201(44) (b) states that "a person gives 'value' for rights if he
acquires them .. . as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a
pre-existing claim . . . ." The judgment creditor buying at his own execution
sale thus acquires property rights in the item he buys by putting the money
he paid toward the satisfaction of a debt, and by doing so he has given
value.
The issue of whether a typical judgment creditor buying at an execu-
tion sale actually buys "without knowledge of the security interest" attracted
the attention of the Vera court. Although the court acknowledged that the
judgment creditor had no actual knowledge of the security interest,33 it
frequently referred to one who "innocently" buys, with the connotation that
"innocence" is another requirement one must fulfill in order to be protected
by section 9-307(2).84 Thus, the court implied that a judgment creditor is
not "innocent" since he is in a better position to receive notice of the security
interest. This implication by the court that the judgment creditor has re-
ceived "constructive knowledge" may, to a certain extent, be true, A creditor,
since he is probably a businessman or financier acquainted with credit trans-
actions, would be more likely than the ordinary buyer to have considered the
possibility of cutting off an unrecorded purchase-money-security-interest
priority in the collateral by buying at the sale.
However, section 1-201(25) specifically states that, "[AI person 'knows'
or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it." Thus, if
courts begin to look into what motivated a particular commercial transaction,
and begin presuming "good motivation" and "bad motivation," a precedent
may be set whereby the lack of actual knowledge and honesty in fact are
not enough," thereby going beyond the explicit Code definition of a buyer's
"knowledge." In the absence of factual distinctions peculiar to a particular
case, the "knowledge" of an outstanding security interest by a buyer at an
32 Some courts held that crediting payment to the debtor's account was not giving
value. E.g., Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 30 Idaho 559, 166 P. 271 (1917) ;
Hughes v. Hess, 141 Tex. 511, 516, 172 S.W.2d 301, 304 (1943). Others held it depended
upon the facts of each case. E.g., Samuel D. Wasserman, Inc. v. Klahre, 24 N.J. Super.
143, 149, 93 A.2d 628, 631-32 (App. Div. 1952).
33
 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 237, 223 N.E.2d at 516.
34 Id. at 241-42, 223 N.E.2d at 518-19.
35 It has been emphasized that a reason the drafters of the Code limited the defini-
tion of "good faith," in section 1-201(19), to honesty in fact was because they felt that
a stricter standard might place a "freeze" on commercial practices. Braucher, The Legis-
lative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 812 (1958).
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execution sale should be considered to be no greater than "knowledge" by
an ordinary consumer buyer.
Another contention relied on by the Vera court in excluding a buyer
at an execution sale from the protection of section 9-307(2) was that the
section was only intended to apply to sales whereby a buyer takes from a
dishonest consumer debtor.36
 Although it might be proposed that a buyer
at an execution sale is taking from the consumer debtor through a "forced"
.sale, thereby making the transaction one between two consumers, such a
contention only establishes a fiction. The buyer at an execution sale does
not deal with the consumer debtor, but, in reality, he bids at an auction
conducted to execute the judgment of a creditor. 37 Therefore, since a buyer
at an execution sale is not buying from a consumer debtor, under the Vera
court's approach he will not be protected by section 9-307(2).
The court's contention that section 9-307(2) refers only to sales between
a consumer-debtor and another consumer gains strong support from various
writers on the Code, who state that the intent of section 9-307(2) is to deal
with sales of consumer goods between a consumer buyer and a consumer
seller." This limited interpretation finds further support in the comment of
the Permanent Editorial Board concerning the rejection of section 9-307(2)
by California and Oklahoma. The Board stated that section 9-307(2) was
of a "limited application," representing a compromise between those who
favored complete protection for the purchase-money security interest and
those who favored protection for the various classes of consumer purchasers
unable to ascertain the existence of security agreements." It is submitted that
this "limited application" refers to a distinction between those protected
under section 9-307(2) and those not protected, based on "from whom they
buy."
A possible alternative interpretation is that "limited application" refers
to the fact that not all buyers are protected, but only those buyers who
fulfill the express requirements of section 9-307(2). Besides restricting the
buyer solely to purchases of consumer goods, section 9-307(2) requires that
he be a consumer, in that he must buy for his own "personal, family or house-
hold purposes." The requirements that the buyer must give "value" and be
"without notice" merely iterate the historically developed requirements of
the "bona fide purchaser." 4° Thus, any "compromise" limiting the various
classes of consumers protected by section 9-307(2) was not accomplished by
86
 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 240-41, 223 N.E.2d at 517-18.
27 E.g., id. at 237, 223 N.E.2d at 516,
38 See 2 P. Coogan, W. Hogan, & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the U.C.C.
§ 19.02(3) (c) (1966); Massachusetts Bankers Association, Bankers Manual on the Uni-
form Commercial Code 140 (1958); Coogan, supra note 23, at 848; Silin, Filing Require-
ments under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Bast. B.J., 13, 14 (Oct., 1959); Vernon,
Priorities, The Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 531, 531-32 n.5 (1963); Wiseman and King, Perfection, Filing and Forms under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 580, 590 (1963),
29 2 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code Rep. 213-14
(1965).
40 See Filtsch v. McJunkins, 123 Okla. 181, 185, 252 P. 437, 441 (1927); Neal v.
Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
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inserting unusually strict requirements into the text of section 9-307(2).
However, if section 9-307(2) is meant to apply only to buyers taking from
a consumer-debtor, there is a very real "compromise." This interpretation
would extend the protection of section 9-307(2) to only a limited class of
consumer buyers while denying the same protection to all other consumer
buyers, regardless of whether they equally bought for "value," "without
knowledge," and for "personal, family or household purposes."
In accord with this proposition, it is submitted that the language of
section 9-307(2) limits its effect to a consumer buyer taking from a consumer
seller. Section 9-307(2) restricts its application to cases involving "consumer
goods," and a buyer of those goods who does so for "personal, family or
household purposes." Since section 9-109 defines "goods" according to the
purpose for which they are used or bought, section 9-307(2) contains a
second reference to consumer goods. However, rather than considering this
as merely a repetition of the same requirement, it is arguable that section
9-307(2) is referring to the "character" of the goods at two points in time:
(I) in the "hands" of the seller, and (2) in the "hands" of the buyer. Section
9-109, Comment 2 supports this interpretation by stating that " [g] oods can
fall into different classes at different times" according to whose hands they
are in. The seller's goods can therefore be considered "consumer goods" if,
in the "hands" of the seller, they meet the definition of "consumer goods" in
section 9-109(1). It is submitted that when section 9-307(2) initially refers
to "consumer goods" it refers to what use the seller must have made of the
goods, and when referring to buying for "personal, family or household
purposes" it refers to the purpose for which the buyer must have bought
the goods. Therefore, in order for a buyer of consumer goods to be protected,
he must buy from a seller of consumer goods.
Although the buyer at an execution sale buys for "personal, family
or household purposes," the goods he receives from his seller are more
properly considered inventory than consumer goods. Since inventory is goods
"held by a person who holds them for sale," 41
 it is arguable that the goods
held by the sheriff, to be sold by him at an auction, are in the category of
inventory. Thus, regardless of the purpose for which the buyer seeks to
purchase the property, the fact that the goods are inventory excludes him
from the protection of section 9-307(2). Section 9-307(1), on the other
hand, is concerned with a seller of inventory since the section protects a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business" 42
 against the assertion of an out-
standing security interest. In order for this section to apply, however, the
security interest must have been created by the "buyer's" seller. It is argu-
able, therefore, that the buyer at an execution sale finds no protection under
section 9-307. This analysis is in accord with those writers on the Code who
believe that section 9-307(2) is restricted to transactions involving a con-
sumer buyer taking from a consumer seller, and it finds further support in
the prevalent Code policy toward the "execution buyer."
By examining the status of a buyer at an execution sale, both under
pre-Code law and related Code sections, it is possible to discover the Code's
41 U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
42 See U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
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policy toward such parties. This approach was not utilized by the Vera court,
but it lends strong support to the court's conclusion. Under pre-Code law, the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions held that one who bought at an
execution sale, whether judgment creditor" or typical consumer,44 bought
subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. It was also generally held that an
execution sale discharged all liens and encumbrances subordinate to the
one being satisfied at the sale." Therefore, the buyer at an execution sale
did not take subject to all liens and encumbrances, but only to those
superior to the one being discharged at the sale. This concept of discharge,
under which the holder of a subordinate lien or encumbrance no longer had
a claim against the collateral, has been retained in section 9-504(4) of the
Code, in regard to sales "forced" by a secured party.
According to section 9-504(4):
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default,
the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The
purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this
Part or of any judicial proceedings. . .
When this section is read in light of section 9-312(4), the position of a buyer
at a "forced" or "involuntary" sale becomes quite clear. Under section
9-312(4), a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if the interest is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral. There-
fore, if such a perfected interest exists in the collateral, a forced sale to
satisfy a non-purchase-money security interest in the collateral will not dis-
charge the purchase-money security interest, if it were perfected at the time
the debtor received possession of the collateral. Although directly concerned
with a sale of collateral forced by a secured party, section 9-504(4) is a strong
indication of the Code's policy concerning the rights and status of a purchaser
at an "involuntary" or "forced," as opposed to a "wholly uncoerced," sale.
It is arguable by analogy, therefore, that an nailed but perfected purchase-
money security interest under section 9-302(1) (d) will not be discharged by
an execution sale forced by a judgment creditor, and the buyer at the sale
will not be protected against the assertion of the superior interest.
IV. SECTION 9-307(2): A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Reviewing the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that a "buyer" under
the Code is included within the definition of purchaser in section 1-201(32).
However, as evidenced by the conflicting theories concerning the effect of the
phrase "any other voluntary transaction" in the definition of purchaser, it
43 E.g., Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575, 583, 32 P. 579, 580 (1893) ; Simmons v.
Clark, 151 Kan. 431, 99 P.2d 739 (1940); Vandin v. Henry McCleary Timber Co., 157
Wash. 635, 289 P. 1016 (1930).
44 See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 659 (1930).
45 Call v. Thunderbird Mortgage Co., 58 Cal. 2d 542, 548, 375 P.2d 169, 172 (1962).
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is far from clear whether "purchasing" under the Code is restricted to volun-
tary transactions or includes "buying" at an execution sale.
An examination of the language and intent of section 9-307(2) and of
Code policy concerning the status of the parties to an "involuntary" trans-
action is more revealing. Although the section is obviously intended to
ameliorate the favored position of purchase-money security interests, the
protection of section 9-307(2) may well be of "limited application." State-
ments by the Vera court, commentators on the Code, and the Permanent Edi-
torial Board, as well as the language of section 9-307(2), all support the con-
tention that section 9-307(2) is intended to include only parties buying
directly from a consumer-debtor. Under this approach a buyer at an execu-
tion sale is excluded from the protection of section 9-307(2) since he cannot,
in actuality, be considered to be buying from a consumer-debtor.
This interpretation of the status of a buyer at an execution sale is also
supportable as an expression of Code policy by section 9-504(4), which
provides that, when upon default, a sale is held to satisfy an outstanding
security interest, the sale discharges only that security interest and any
security interests subordinate thereto. The same policy would support the
contention that a buyer at an "involuntary" sale, including a buyer at an
execution sale, does not take free of a prior purchase-money security interest.
Thus, it is submitted that a buyer at an execution sale is not included
within the protection of section 9-307(2). This conclusion raises the question
whether the position of the buyer at an execution sale is such that section
9-307(2) should be changed to include him within its protection. Since the
judgment creditor buying at an execution sale and the ordinary consumer
buying at an execution sale can generally be assumed to fulfill the require-
ments stipulated in section 9-307(2), the only reasonable purpose for
limiting section 9-307(2)'s protection to consumer buyers taking from
consumer sellers is that any extension of protection under section 9-307(2)
would increase the risk of perfection without filing under section 9-302( I) (d),
and consequently, increase the volume of initial filings of purchase-money
security interests. If there is a "significant" increase in the "risk," it is argu-
able that the importance of maintaining the obviously favored status of the
purchase-money security interest would outweigh any inequity to the buyer
at an execution sale.
Since the only "risk" to the holder of a purchase-money security interest
envisioned by section 9-307(2) is the risk of sale of the collateral by a dis-
honest debtor, the extension of protection to a buyer at an execution sale
would in fact be an additional risk the creditor must consider in making his
decision as to whether he should file. It is submitted, however, that the
risk of the collateral being sold at an execution sale is of minimal practical
importance to the secured party's decision to file, and any increase in the
"risk" to the secured party is outweighed by the inequity to the buyer.
Since the holder of a purchase-money security interest is generally a
financier or businessman," his interest in the method of disposition of the
collateral only extends to whether it affects his ability to recover the amount
46 see
 Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 35 Va. L. Rev. 577, 578-80 (1949).
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of his investment or sale price of the item. Regardless of the method of
sale, in order to receive any proceeds the secured party must perfect his
security interest in the proceeds by filing a financing statement within ten
days of the sale.47 Therefore, if the collateral is sold at an execution sale, the
secured party has a better chance of being able to perfect his security
interest than if the collateral is privately sold by a dishonest debtor, because
in all probability a sale by the debtor would be carried out with the least
publicity possible, whereas an execution sale, by its very nature, requires
the giving of public notice. 48 Thus, there is little increase in the overall risk
of the secured party losing the entire amount of his investment due to a
failure to perfect his security interest in the proceeds. Also, if the secured
party has filed within ten days of the sale, there is little chance that he will
get back less proceeds from the execution sale than he would from a sale
by a dishonest debtor. In fact, since a sale by a dishonest debtor is not
subject to the external controls of an execution sale, the secured party will
probably recover a greater percentage of the proceeds from an execution
sale than from a sale by a dishonest debtor.
Thus, including a buyer at an execution sale under the protection of
section 9-307(2) only slightly increases the overall risk of perfecting by
section 9-302(1)(d). On the other hand, if a buyer at an execution sale is
not protected by section 9-307(2), he is left in a particularly unfortunate
position. As demonstrated earlier, he cannot be assumed to have any greater
"knowledge" of the existing purchase-money security interest than the typical
buyer protected by section 9-307(2).
Because of the similar circumstances of the "9-307(2) buyer" and the
buyer at an execution sale, it is suggested that the protection of section
9-307(2) be extended to the buyer at an execution sale by inserting into
section 9-307(2), after the word "buyer," the phrase "including a buyer at
an execution sale."
JEFFREY M. SIGER
47 U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
48 E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 692 (West 1955); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.6031
(1962); N.Y. Lien Law § 202 (McKinney 1966); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2312 (1951).
107
